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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
After police raided his home and discovered harvested and still-growing 
marijuana, Mark Beavers was charged with trafficking in marijuana and possessing 
marijuana with the intent to deliver. This was the First Case. While Mr. Beavers was 
out on bond awaiting trial in the First Case, he sold additional marijuana to an 
undercover police officer, was arrested, and had his car and his automobile searched. 
Again, police found harvested and still-growing marijuana. This time, he was charged 
with delivery of marijuana, possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver, and 
trafficking in marijuana. This was the Second Case. 
In his two separate trials, Mr. Beavers attempted to present "necessity" defenses, 
arguing that the marijuana seized in both cases was intended for his personal use and 
was necessary to treat his various medical conditions. However, his efforts in this 
regard were thwarted to varying degrees by the respective district courts. Ultimately, 
Mr. Beavers was found guilty of most of the charged offenses in the two cases. 
At a joint sentencing hearing, the district court ruled that Mr. Beavers' sentences 
in the Second Case could be enhanced based on his "prior conviction" in the First Case, 
and it imposed an aggregate sentence of twelve years, with three years fixed. 
On appeal, Mr. Beavers presents three distinct claims of error: (1) the district 
court erred in the First Case by refusing to instruct the jury regarding the common law 
defense of necessity; (2) the district court erred in the Second Case by precluding 
Mr. Beavers from presenting evidence in support of a necessity defense, and by 
refusing to instruct the jury on that defense; and (3) the district court erred at the joint 
sentencing hearing insofar as it concluded that Mr. Beavers' sentences in the Second 
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Case could be enhanced by his "prior convictions" in the First Case, even though no 
convictions had actually been entered in the First Case as of the time that Mr. Beavers 
allegedly committed the offenses at issue in the Second Case. In light of these errors, 
Mr. Beavers respectfully requests new trials in both cases or, in the alternative, a new 
joint sentencing hearing. 
In response, the State argues that, as a matter of law, the "necessity" defense is 
inapplicable to any of the offenses charged in either the First Case or the Second Case 
(trafficking in marijuana, delivery of marijuana, or possession of marijuana with intent to 
deliver). (Respondent's Brief, pp.10, 11-15, 29.) Alternatively, it argues that, even if the 
"necessity" defense is a theoretically possibility, the district courts did not err in either 
case because, in the First Case, Mr. Beavers failed to offer trial evidence sufficient to 
warrant a "necessity" instruction, and, in the Second Case, Mr. Beavers failed to make 
an offer of proof sufficient to entitle him to present a "necessity" defense ( or warrant an 
instruction). (Respondent's Brief, pp.16-23, 25-29.) In addition, the State argues that 
Mr. Beavers' sentencing arguments have no merit because the district court correctly 
interpreted the sentencing enhancement at issue to apply to the Second Case even 
though Mr. Beavers was not "convicted" in the First Case until after he allegedly 
committed his crimes in the Second Case and, besides, any error was harmless 
because the district court probably would have imposed the same sentence even 
absent the availability of the enhancement. (Respondent's Brief, pp.30-36.) 
The State has cross-appealed on an issue very closely related to the sentencing 
issue. In its cross-appeal, the State complains about the fact that, although the district 
court found that the sentencing enhancement at issue was available under the relevant 
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statute, it did not apply that enhancement because Mr. Beavers' admission to the facts 
underlying the enhancement was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary (because 
Mr. Beavers had never been apprised of the possible penalty). The State then argues 
that this ruling was tantamount to a sua sponte withdrawal of a plea, such that the State 
should have been returned to the status quo ante. (Respondent's Brief, pp.37-43.) 
Alternatively, the State argues that the district court imposed an illegal sentence by 
declining to apply the enhancement. (Respondent's Brief, pp.43-35.) 
The present brief responds to each of the State's arguments, and is intended to 
point out the reasons why each argument fails. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The factual and procedural histories of these cases were previously set forth in 
detail in Mr. Beavers' Appellant's Brief. Therefore, they are not reiterated herein. 
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ISSUES 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Beavers raised three issues for this Court's 
consideration on appeal. Those issues are as follows 1: 
1. Did the district court err in Mr. Beavers' First Case by refusing to instruct 
the jury on the affirmative defense of necessity? 
2. Did the district court err in Mr. Beavers' Second Case by refusing to allow 
Mr. Beavers to present evidence in support of his proffered necessity 
defense, and by refusing to instruct the jury on that defense? 
3. Did the district court err at Mr. Beaver's joint sentencing hearing by 
enhancing Mr. Beavers' sentences in the Second Case based on its 
finding that Mr. Beavers had been previously convicted of certain drug 
offenses in the First Case? 
The State has cross-appealed. Thus, the State has identified a fourth issue for 
this Court's consideration. It states that issue as follows: 
4. "Did ihe district court err when, after withdrawing Beavers' admission to a 
sentencing enhancement, it failed to reinstate the parties to the status quo 
prior to the admission having been made?"2 
1 The State has chosen to "rephrase the issues" on appeal in an apparent attempt to 
make its issue statement argumentative. (See Respondent's Brief, p.9.) Nevertheless, 
the issues on appeal are still the same issues originally identified and argued in 
Mr. Beavers' Appellant's Brief. 
2 Respondent's Brief, p.9. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
In Mr. Beavers' First Case, The District Court Erred In Failing To Instruct The Jury On 
The Affirmative Defense Of Necessity 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Beavers contends that the district court erred in the First Case when it denied 
his request that the jury be instructed that, even if it found that Mr. Beavers possessed 
marijuana, it could find him not guilty on the basis of the common law defense of 
necessity based on the fact that his use of marijuana was necessary to treat his medical 
condition. (Appellant's Brief, pp.21-28.) In making this argument, he asserts that he 
met his burden of production as to the four elements of the defense by offering evidence 
that: (1) he faced a specific threat of immediate harm, i.e., a debilitating gastrointestinal 
condition; (2) his gastrointestinal condition was not a product of his own doing; (3) he 
could not have obtained relief from his gastrointestinal condition by means other than 
the use of marijuana; and (4) the harm caused by using marijuana, if any, was not 
disproportionate to the suffering avoided. (Appellant's Brief, pp.24-28.) 
In response, the State argues that, as a matter of law, the necessity defense is 
inapplicable to any of the offenses charged in the First Case (trafficking in marijuana 
and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver). (Respondent's Brief, pp.10, 11-15.) 
Alternatively, it argues that, even if the necessity defense is a theoretically possibility, 
the district court did not err because Mr. Beavers failed to offer trial evidence sufficient 
to warrant a necessity instruction. (Respondent's Brief, pp.16-23.) 
For the reasons set forth more fully below, neither of the State's present 
arguments have merit. 
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B. The Necessity Defense Is Applicable To The Offense Of Trafficking In Marijuana, 
At Least As It Was Charged In The First Case 
The State offers two reasons why it believes the necessity defense was barred 
as a matter of law in the First Case: first, necessity is only a defense to the crime of 
possession of a controlled substance, not trafficking or possession with intent to deliver 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.11-13); second, marijuana can never be medically necessary in 
Idaho (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-15). Taking these arguments in reverse order, 
Mr. Beavers explains below why neither has merit and why, in fact, the necessity 
defense was available in the First Case. 
1. The Necessity Defense Is Applicable To Offenses Involving Marijuana 
The State argues (for the first time on appeal) that marijuana can never be 
medically necessary. (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-15.) The State reasons that since 
marijuana was designated a Schedule I controlled substance when the Uniform 
Controlled Substances Act (hereinaffer, UCSA) was adopted in 1971, and since the 
UCSA provides that in order for the board of pharmacy to subsequently add any drug to 
Schedule I, it would have to find (among other things) that that drug has no accepted 
medical use, the Idaho Legislature has already determined that marijuana has no 
medical benefits and, therefore, marijuana can never be medically necessary as a 
matter of law. (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-15.) The State also finds it significant that 
marijuana's designation has never been changed by the board of pharmacy. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.14 & n.4, p.5.) However, the State's arguments are misplaced. 
First, and foremost, the State has misstated the criteria for placing a drug in 
Schedule I. The Idaho Code provides that "[t]he board [of pharmacy] shall place a 
substance in schedule I if it finds that the substance: (a) [h]as high potential for abuse; 
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and (b) [h]as no accepted medical use in treatment in the United States or lacks 
accepted safety for use in treatment under medical supervision." I.C. § 37-2704 
(emphasis added). Thus, the fact that marijuana is classified as a Schedule I controlled 
substance does not necessarily indicate that any finding has ever been made-whether 
it have been by the Idaho Legislature or the board of pharmacy-that marijuana has no 
accepted medical use; it may very well be that marijuana was designated a Schedule I 
controlled substance because it has been determined to "lack[ ] accepted safety for use 
in treatment under medical supervision." I.C. § 37-2704(b). 
Notably, because it uses of the disjunctive "or" in articulating the criteria for 
adding substances to Schedule I, Idaho's Controlled Substances Act differs from the 
federal controlled substances law, which uses the conjunctive "and" in defining 
Schedule I controlled substances. Under federal law, a substance can only be added to 
Schedule I upon findings that the substance "has a high potential for abuse," "has no 
currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States," and lacks "accepted 
safety for use of the drug or other substance under medical supervision." 21 
U.S.C. § 812(b)(1); United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 532 U.S. 
483, 492 (2001). And, indeed, this is a critical distinction since, in Oakland Cannabis 
Buyers' Cooperative, the conclusion that federal law necessarily requires a finding that 
the substance in question-in that case marijuana-has no accepted medical use, was 
critical to the high Court's conclusion that no medical necessity defense is available to a 
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defendant prosecuted under federal law. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 432 
U.S. at 491-94.3 
Second, the State simply assumes that the same criteria required to be used by 
the board of pharmacy in adding substances to Schedule I, i.e., those set forth in 
/.C. § 37-2704, were applied when the original version of Schedule I was adopted in 
1971; however, the State has offered no support for this proposition and it appears to be 
nothing more than speculation. 
Third, the State incorrectly implies that the board of pharmacy has an affirmative 
duty to continually update Idaho's schedules of controlled substances based on cutting 
edge advancements in the field of medicine. However, although the board of pharmacy 
is required to "revise and republish the schedules" of controlled substances annually, 
I.C. § 37-2714, this does not mean that the board of pharmacy continually re-evaluates 
the designation of every substance listed in one of Idaho's six schedules. Indeed, the 
USCA provides that the board of pharmacy "may add substances to or delete or 
reschedule" the substances listed in Idaho's six schedules of controlled substances. 
I.C. § 37-2702(a). Accordingly, it may very well be that, even assuming there were no 
accepted medical uses for marijuana in 1971, there are now, nearly forty years later.4 
3 There is an open question as to whether the federal courts can recognize and apply 
the common law defense of necessity. See Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 
532 U.S. at 490. Accordingly, even if the federal controlled substances statute was not 
critically different from the Idaho statute, the cases may still have been distinguishable. 
See I.C. § 73-116 ("The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to, or 
inconsistent with, the constitution or laws of the United States, in all cases not provided 
for in these compiled laws, is the rule of decision in all the courts of this state."). 
4 As the State points out elsewhere in Respondent's Brief (pp.20-21 ), numerous States 
now have medical marijuana laws. Thus, it appears that marijuana does, in fact, have 
some medical use in treatment in the United States. 
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Finally, in arguing that marijuana can never be medically necessary simply 
because it is listed as a Schedule I controlled substance, the State simply ignores the 
Idaho Supreme Court's decision in State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854, 801 P.2d 563 
(1990), where the Court explicitly held that the necessity defense can be invoked in 
cases involving marijuana.5 Surely, when the Court decided Hastings in 1990, it was 
fully aware of the fact that marijuana was a Schedule I controlled substance. 
2. The Necessity Defense Is Applicable To The Offense Of Trafficking, At 
Least As It Was Charged In The First Case 
Insofar as it does recognize the existence of the Hastings decision (and the fact 
that, in that case, the Idaho Supreme Court explicitly recognized that the necessity 
defense may be invoked in cases involving the medicinal use of marijuana), the State 
argues that, as a matter of law, the holding of Hastings must be limited to the facts of 
that case; specifically, it contends that the necessity offense, while it may be applicable 
to the charge of marijuana possession, does not extend to the crimes of trafficking in 
marijuana and possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver. (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.11-13.) The State bases this argument on the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion in 
State v. Tadlock, 136 Idaho 413, 34 P.3d 1096 (Ct. App. 2001). (Respondent's Brief, 
p.13.) 
In Tadlock, the Court of Appeals declined to decide whether the defendant, 
charged with, and found guilty of, possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, had 
met her burden of establishing a prima facie defense of medical necessity. Tadlock, 
5 As controlling precedent, Hastings can only be overturned by the Supreme Court upon 
a finding that its holding is manifestly wrong, it has proven to be unjust or unwise, or that 
such overruling is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy 
continued injustice. State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230,232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005). 
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136 Idaho at 415, 34 P.3d at 1098. It declined to decide this issue on the basis that any 
error would have been harmless because the jury found that the defendant had 
possessed the intent to deliver and, therefore, "[t]he defense [could] not logically apply . 
" Id. 
Based on Tadlock, the State's argument would be infinitely reasonable if 
Mr. Beavers had only been found guilty of possession with intent to deliver in the First 
Case. However, Mr. Beavers was also charged with, and found guilty of trafficking in 
marijuana-based solely on the a/legation that he had possessed a large amount of it. 
(See R., pp.66-67 (Information), p.540 Uury instruction on the elements of the trafficking 
charge).) Thus, with regard to the trafficking charge-at least as it was alleged in this 
case-the necessity defense does logically apply. 
With regard to the trafficking charge, the State claims that "necessity is not a 
viable justification" because "[t]he legislature has effectively determined that possession 
of a large amount of marijuana cannot be for personal use" and "an individual cannot 
'need' to possess one pound or more of marijuana." (Respondent's Brief, p.13.) This 
argument boils down to a claim that the crime of trafficking calls for proof of an intent to 
deliver the drugs in question, but that proof of the quantity of drugs possessed 
necessarily proves the intent to deliver those drugs. (See Respondent's Brief, p.13.) 
However, the State cites absolutely no authority for this fanciful interpretation of the 
UCSA. ( See Respondent's Brief, p.13.) Moreover, the State's interpretation is 
inconsistent with the plain language of the UCSA, which must control given the lack of 
ambiguity in the statute. State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 386-87, 957 P.2d 1099, 
1102-03 (Ct. App. 1998). It also appears inconsistent with State v. Rogerson, 132 
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Idaho 53, 56, 966 P.3d 53, 56 (Ct. App. 1998), where the Court of Appeals held that 
"[t]he Idaho legislature elected not to include an element of delivery or intent to deliver in 
the definition of the crime it called 'trafficking' in a controlled substance." Finally, it is 
important to note that if the State were correct in its interpretation of the UCSA, the 
crime of possession with intent to deliver would be a lesser-included offense of 
trafficking, see 8/ockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 289, 304 (1932) ("[W]here the 
same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the 
test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether 
each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not."), and 1\/lr. Beavers' 
conviction of both offenses in this case would offend the Double Jeopardy clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168-69 (1977). 
C. Given The Facts Of Mr. Beavers' First Case, The District Court Should Have 
Instructed The Jury On The Affirmative Defense Of Necessity 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Beavers examined the evidence offered at trial in the 
First Case and argued that that evidence was sufficient to support an instruction on the 
defense of necessity. (Appellant's Brief, pp.24-28.) Specifically, he argued that he 
presented prima facie evidence of the four elements of the necessity defense. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.24-28.) 
In response, the State discusses much of the same evidence and asserts that 
Mr. Beavers failed to present sufficient evidence as to two of the four elements of the 
necessity defense. (Respondent's Brief, pp.16-22.) In particular, the State claims that 
Mr. Beavers failed to present sufficient evidence of a specific threat of immediate harm 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.16-18), and that he failed to present evidence showing that his 
health problems could not have been treated through a less offensive alternative, i.e., 
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conventional medicine (Respondent's Brief, pp.18-22). Interestingly, the State also 
argues that there is a fifth element which is implied in the necessity defense-a 
causation element-and that Mr. Beavers failed to offer sufficient evidence as to that 
element as well. (Respondent's Brief, pp.22-23.) 
For the reasons set forth in detail below, the State's present arguments are 
without merit. 
1. Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Of A Specific Threat Of Immediate 
Harm, i.e., A Debilitating Gastrointestinal Condition 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Beavers argued that, at trial, he presented evidence 
of a specific threat of immediate harm by testifying as to the details of the debilitating 
gastrointestinal condition from which he suffered. (Appellant's Brief, pp.24-25.) In 
response, the State asserts that Mr. Beavers "failed to show 'immediacy"' of harm 
because his testimony indicated that, once he began using marijuana to treat his illness, 
his condition actually improved and became manageable. (Respondent's Brief, pp.16-
18.) The State's theory, apparently, is that once Mr. Beavers' condition began to 
improve, he was required to have stopped using marijuana and become gravely ill again 
and, only at that time, could he resume his use of marijuana under a necessity defense. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.16-18.) Such an argument, however, is patently absurd. When 
a hiker trespasses upon someone else's cabin in the wilderness in order to avoid dying 
from exposure during a storm, is he required to warm himself quickly, then go out into 
the storm again until he becomes hypothermic, and only then return to the cabin? 
Under the State's argument, he would. However, a much more rational interpretation of 
the necessity defense is that, as long as the storm rages outside, the interloper may 
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remain. Likewise, as long as Mr. Beavers' condition existed, he was justified in using 
marijuana to manage the symptoms. 
2. Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Indicating That He Did Not Bring About 
The Harm (The Debilitating Gastrointestinal Condition) Necessitating His 
Illegal Act, i.e., His Possession And Use Of Marijuana 
Since the State does not contest Mr. Beavers' assertion that he presented 
adequate evidence that he did not bring about the harm (his debilitating gastrointestinal 
condition) necessitating his marijuana possession and use, no further discussion of that 
element of the necessity defense is required. 
3. Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Showing That The Same Objective, i.e., 
Treatment Of His Health Condition, Could Not Have Been Accomplished 
By A Less Offensive Alternative, e.g., Traditional Medicine, That Was 
Actually Available, i.e., Affordable, To Him 
At trial, Mr. Beavers presented evidence that the same objective achieved 
through his use of marijuana, i.e., treatment of his health condition, could not have been 
accomplished by a less offensive alternative, such as conventional medicine, that was 
actually available, i.e., affordable, to him. This testimony, he argued in his Appellant's 
Brief, was prima facie evidence of the third element of the necessity defense. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.26-28.) 
In response, the State's primary argument is that Mr. Beavers' testimony in this 
regard is not "reasonable" because he failed to explain, to the State's satisfaction, why 
he needed to possess such a large quantity of marijuana. (Respondent's Brief, pp.19-
22.) This argument, however, is without merit. 
First, the State's argument is logically flawed. The quantity of marijuana at issue 
is wholly irrelevant to the question of whether Mr. Beavers had a medical need to use 
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marijuana generally; it goes only to the weight of his testimony, which should have been 
a question for the jury. 
Second, even if the quantity of marijuana at issue was probative of Mr. Beavers' 
medical need for marijuana, other states' medical marijuana laws are not the slightest 
bit relevant to the determination of whether the quantity at issue in this case was a 
personal use amount or something else. After all, in a state where there is explicit 
statutory authorization for the purchase, possession, and use (for medicinal purposes) 
of marijuana, marijuana would be easier to obtain than it is in Idaho and, therefore, 
there would be no need to stock up. Since Mr. Beavers was growing his own 
marijuana, he would have needed to plan months, and even seasons, in advance for his 
medicinal needs. Indeed, Mr. Beavers testified that, with regard to the herbs grown in 
his outdoor garden, he had to grow as much as he could in the summertime and 
process whatever he did not use during the growing season for long-term storage. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.823, L.15 - p.824, L.12.) Thus, it is reasonable to infer that this same 
approach held true for marijuana. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.826, Ls.6-9 (Mr. Beavers testifying 
that he did not grow marijuana in his outdoor greenhouses in winter).) 
Third, to the extent that the quantity of marjjuana could be probative of 
Mr. Beavers' medical need for marijuana, the State is incorrect when it claims that 
Mr. Beavers never explained why he needed so much marijuana.6 Mr. Beavers testified 
that in using marijuana medicinally, he had to "use it throughout the day" and that his 
6 With regard to the quantity of marijuana at issue, one must remember that, although 
Mr. Beavers was originally charged with possessing 25 pounds or more of marijuana 
(R., pp.66-67), he was acquitted of that charge and found guilty of the lesser charge of 
possessing between five and 25 pounds of marijuana (R., pp.562-64). 
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use was actually greater than it would have been had he been using it recreationally. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.800, Ls.4-11, p.854, L.13-p.855, L.2.) He also testified that, in addition to 
smoking marijuana, he began integrating it into his diet. (Tr. Vol. I, p.800, L.13 - p.801, 
L.12, p.805, L.5 - p.807, L.6, p.807, L.24 - p.809, L.11, p.811, Ls.5-14, p.812, L.22 -
p.813, L.1.) Presumably, this would have required far greater quantities of marijuana 
than smoking. Moreover, as the State points out (Respondent's Brief, p.19), 
Mr. Beavers testified that he purchased land in Washington and was planning to move 
there (Tr. Vol. I, p.817, Ls.7-15, p.819, Ls.18-20, p.824, Ls.13-22), and that this planned 
move affected the amount of marijuana he was growing. (Tr. Vol. I, p.824, Ls.13-22, 
p.826, Ls.6-19.) Obviously, Mr. Beavers would have had to have had an adequate 
supply of marijuana to cover his medical needs during the time period of the move itself, 
and for however long it would have taken him to grow a new crop of marijuana plants 
once he got settled in Washington. In fact, Mr. Beavers testified that by the time his 
marijuana was seized in the present case, he had a sufficient quantity of marijuana leaf 
material to cover his move to Washington; however, he did not have a sufficient quantity 
of bud material, and he needed both leaf and bud material to alleviate his symptoms. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.826, Ls.6-19.) 
4. Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Supporting The Conclusion That The 
Harm Caused, i.e., Commission Of A "Victimless" Crime Of Morality, Was 
Not Disproportionate To The Harm Avoided, i.e., Mr. Beavers' Continued 
Suffering And Incapacitation 
Since the State does not contest Mr. Beavers' assertion that he presented 
adequate evidence that the harm caused by his possession and use of marijuana was 
not disproportionate to the harm he was suffering because of his gastrointestinal 
condition, no further discussion of that element of the necessity defense is required. 
15 
5. There Is No Requirement That The Defendant Prove A "Causal 
Connection Between the Unlawful Conduct And The Harm Averted" 
Although the State acknowledges that in Hastings the Idaho Supreme Court 
identified four elements to the necessity defense, the State goes on to argue that there 
is actually a fifth element to the necessity defense-causation-which Mr. Beavers 
failed to satisfy in this case. (Respondent's Brief, pp.22-24.) There are a host of 
problems, however, with the State's argument. 
First, the State cites two Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Opinions in support of its 
"causal connection" argument; however, those cases identify the elements to the 
necessity defense under federal law, and those elements are slightly different than the 
elements of the necessity defense under Idaho law. See United States v. Schoon, 971 
F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 430-31 (9th Cir. 
1985).7 Mr. Beavers submits the elements of the necessity defense under Idaho law 
are best stated in the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Hastings. 
Second, the Ninth Circuit cases cited by the State do not even stand for the 
proposition now asserted by the State. Neither Schoon, nor Dorrell, requires the 
defendant to come forward with "causation" evidence demonstrating that his conduct 
actually averted some harm; those cases merely require him to show that he 
7 In Idaho, the four elements to the necessity defense are: (1) a specific threat of 
immediate harm; (2) the threat of harm was not brought about by the defendant's own 
action; (3) there are no less offensive alternatives to illegal action; and (4) the harm 
caused by the illegal action is not disproportionate to the harm avoided. Hastings, 118 
Idaho at 855, 801 P.3d at 564. In the federal courts, the four elements to the necessity 
defense are: (1) the defendant chose the lesser of two evils; (2) the defendant acted to 
prevent imminent harm; (3) the defendant reasonably anticipated a direct causal 
relationship between his conduct and the harm to be averted; and (4) the defendant had 
no legal alternatives to violating the law. Schoon, 971 F.2d at 195; Dorrell, 758 F.2d at 
430-31. 
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"reasonably anticipated" that his actions would avert the harm in question. Schoon, 971 
F.2d at 195; Dorrell, 758 F.2d at430-31. 
Third, the State's argument is illogical. There is no principled reason why a 
defendant ought to be required to prove that his otherwise illegal actions, which he is 
seeking to justify based on necessity, turned out to be successful in the end. By such 
reasoning, the criminality of the actions of the lost hiker seeking temporary refuge in 
another's cabin during a blizzard would turn not on the reasonableness of his actions 
under the circumstances, but only on the ultimate success of his efforts. Thus, if 
despite his best, most reasonable efforts, the lost hiker still suffered frostbite or other 
permanent injury, under the State's theory, he would still be criminally liable. This would 
be an absurd result. Thus, Mr. Beavers submits that if anything is to be read into the 
Hastings test, it would be the requirement only that the otherwise illegal action taken 
have been calculated (or reasonably calculated) to avoid the harm in question. 
Finally, even if there is some additional causation element to the necessity 
defense, the fact is that Mr. Beavers satisfied his burden with regard to that element. 
Mr. Beavers testified that the marijuana helped him significantly, allowing him to go from 
a point where he "virtually couldn't work" to where he "felt that [he] was doing a 
reasonably good job managing" his illness. (Tr. Vol. I, p.854, L.13 - p.855, L.5.) In 
addition, he testified that after he was arrested and stopped using marijuana, his 
condition worsened again. (Tr. Vol. I, p.827, Ls.2-8.) 
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11. 
The District Court Erred In Mr. Beavers' Second Case By Refusing To Allow 
Mr. Beavers To Present Evidence In Support Of His Proffered Necessity Defense, And 
By Refusing To Instruct The Jury On That Defense 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Beavers contends that the district court erred in the Second Case when it 
precluded him from presenting any evidence in support of a necessity defense. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.28-35.) As with his argument with regard to the First Case, he 
asserts that he met his burden of production as to the four elements of the defense by 
offering evidence, through his offer of proof, that: (1) he faced a specific threat of 
immediate harm, i.e., a debilitating gastrointestinal condition; (2) his gastrointestinal 
condition was not a product of his own doing; (3) he could not have obtained relief from 
his gastrointestinal condition by means other than the use of marijuana; and (4) the 
harm caused by using marijuana, if any, was not disproportionate to the suffering 
avoided. (Appellant's Brief, pp.28-35.) 
In response, the State argues that the district court did not err because 
Mr. Beavers' offer of proof was insufficient to allow him to present his defense. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.24-29.) The State also asserts that, for the same reasons the 
necessity defense was unavailable as a matter of law in the First Case, it was also 
unavailable in the Second Case. (Respondent's Brief, p.29.) 
For the reasons discussed in detail below, the State's arguments are without 
merit. 
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B. The Necessity Defense Is Applicable To The Offense Of Trafficking In Marijuana, 
At Least As It Was Charged In The Second Case 
Incorporating, by reference, its arguments with regard to the unavailability of the 
necessity defense as a matter of law in the First Case, the State also asserts that the 
necessity defense was unavailable to Mr. Beavers in the Second Case. (Respondent's 
Brief, p.29.) However, for the reasons discussed in Part l(B), above, the State's 
arguments are without merit and, in fact, the necessity defense is available for 
marijuana-related offenses, and it is available to defendants charged with trafficking, at 
least as Mr. Beavers was charged with trafficking in the Second Case. 
C. Given The Facts Of Mr. Beavers' Second Case, The District Court Should Have 
Allowed Mr. Beavers To Present Evidence Relating To The Affirmative Defense 
Of Necessity, And It Should Have Instructed The Jury About That Defense 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Beavers examined the evidence revealed through his 
offer of proof in the Second Case and argued that that evidence established a prima 
facie defense of necessity, such that he should have been allowed to have presented it 
to the jury. (Appellant's Brief, pp.30-35.) 
In response, the State discusses some of the same evidence, asserts that 
Mr. Beavers failed to present prima facie evidence as to two of the four elements of the 
necessity defense, and on that basis argues that the district court correctly precluded 
Mr. Beavers from presenting any evidence in support of a necessity defense. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.25-29.) In particular, the State claims that Mr. Beavers failed to 
present sufficient evidence of a specific threat of immediate harm (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.25-26), and that he failed to present evidence showing that his health problems 
could not have been treated through a less offensive alternative, i.e., conventional 
medicine (Respondent's Brief, pp.26-29). The State also argues that there is a fifth 
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element which is implied in the necessity defense-a causation element-and that 
Mr. Beavers failed to offer sufficient evidence as to that element as well. (Respondent's 
Brief, p.29.) 
For the reasons set forth in detail below, the State's present arguments are 
without merit. 
1. Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Of A Specific Threat Of Immediate 
Harm, i.e .• A Debilitating Gastrointestinal Condition 
The State contends that, although Mr. Beavers testified extensively regarding his 
serious, chronic health conditions, his offer of proof failed to rise to the level of prima 
facie evidence of a threat of immediate harm because: (1) he could have sought 
conventional medical treatments for his health problems (Respondent's Brief, pp.25-26); 
(2) his condition was not a "true emergency" (Respondent's Brief, p.26). Neither of 
these arguments, however, has merit. 
First, to the extent that the State seeks to argue about whether Mr. Beavers 
could have sought conventional treatments for his conditions is not relevant to the 
question of whether there was a specific threat of immediate harm; those arguments are 
best directed at the State's claim that Mr. Beavers' offer of proof failed to satisfy his 
burden of production with regard to the third element of the necessity defense-whether 
the same objective could not have been accomplished by a less offensive alternative. 
Second, the State's "true emergency" argument is woefully misplaced, as it 
suggests that only acute medical crises can satisfy the first element of the necessity 
test. However, there is nothing in Hastings which would support such a contention. 
Rather, Hastings very clearly indicates that the necessity defense is just as viable for 
sufferers of chronic diseases as it is for sufferers of acute attacks. See generally 
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Hastings, 118 Idaho 854, 801 P.2d 563 (holding that the necessity defense was 
available to a marijuana user who suffered from rheumatoid arthritis and who suffered 
pain and muscle spasms associated with that disease). 
2. Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Indicating That He Did Not Bring About 
The Harm (The Debilitating Gastrointestinal Condition) Necessitating His 
Illegal Act, i.e., His Possession And Use Of Marijuana 
Since the State does not contest Mr. Beavers' assertion that he presented 
adequate evidence that he did not bring about the harm (his debilitating gastrointestinal 
condition) necessitating his marijuana possession and use, no further discussion of that 
element of the necessity defense is required. 
3. Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Showing That The Same Objective, i.e., 
Treatment Of His Health Problems, Could Not Have Been Accomplished 
By A Less Offensive Alternative, e.g., Traditional Medicine, That Was 
Actually Available, i.e., Affordable, To Him 
In his offer of proof, Mr. Beavers presented evidence that the same objective 
achieved through his use of marijuana, i.e., treatment of his health conditions, could not 
have been accomplished by a less offensive alternative, such as conventional medicine, 
that was actually available, i.e., affordable, to him. This testimony, he argued in his 
Appellant's Brief, was prima facie evidence of the third element of the necessity 
defense. (Appellant's Brief, pp.32-34.) 
In response, the State offers two arguments: first, the State claims that, 
Mr. Beavers' testimony notwithstanding, the evidence shows that he could afford to 
seek conventional medical treatment for his conditions; second, the amount of 
marUuana at issue proves that Mr. Beavers was not using marijuana for medicinal 
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purposes. (Respondent's Brief, pp.26-29; see also Respondent's Brief, pp.25-26.) 
These arguments, however, are without merit. 
With regard to its claim that Mr. Beavers could afford conventional medical 
treatment for his health conditions, the State points out that, at some point, Mr. Beavers 
did go to the emergency room for treatment of a kidney stone and that at one point he 
also sought conventional treatment for his irritable bowel syndrome. The State also 
points out that, during the time period that he was using marijuana medicinally, 
Mr. Beavers was able to keep his home and buy a few items. Thus, the State 
concludes, Mr. Beavers could afford medical treatment for his various ailments. This 
argument, however, is directly contradicted by the evidence. Mr. Beavers testified that 
he did not have medical insurance and had to pay out-of-pocket for any medical care 
that he obtained. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.81, Ls.7-14.) Further, he testified that, at one point, he 
sought conventional treatments (Tr. Vol. VI, p.83, Ls.1-9), he saw numerous doctors in 
the process, running up medical bills he could scarcely afford (Tr. Vol. VI, p.68, Ls.5-20, 
p.81, Ls.15-22), and he eventually had to stop going to the doctor because he could no 
longer afford the necessary care (Tr. Vol. VI, p.82, Ls.19-23; see also Tr. Vol. VI, p.84, 
Ls.21-23 (testifying that he could not afford to see specialists)). Thus, at this stage, the 
State's argument seems to be that Mr. Beavers was correctly denied an opportunity to 
defend himself simply because the State planned to counter the evidence he intended 
to offer; however, as discussed in Mr. Beavers' Appellant's Brief, this is not the standard 
for determining whether the defendant is allowed to present his defense to the jury. The 
standard is whether his offer of proof established a prima facie case and, in this case, it 
did. 
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With regard to the State's argument concerning the quantity of marijuana at 
issue, as discussed in Part l(C)(3), above, that argument is logically flawed because, 
among other things, the quantity of marijuana at issue is wholly irrelevant to the 
question of whether Mr. Beavers had a medical need to use marijuana generally. 
4. Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Supporting The Conclusion That The 
Harm Caused, i.e., Commission Of A "Victimless" Crime Of Morality, Was 
Not Disproportionate To The Harm Avoided, i.e., Mr. Beavers' Continued 
Suffering And Incapacitation 
Since the State does not contest Mr. Beavers' assertion that he presented 
adequate evidence that the harm caused by his possession and use of marijuana was 
not disproportionate to the harm he was suffering because of his gastrointestinal 
condition, no further discussion of that element of the necessity defense is required. 
5. There Is No Requirement That The Defendant Prove A "Causal 
Connection Between the Unlawful Conduct And The Harm Averted" 
Incorporating, by reference, its arguments with regard to an implied causation 
element in the necessity defense insofar as that defense was applicable in the First 
Case, the State also asserts that Mr. Beavers failed to present prima facie evidence of 
causation in the Second Case. (Respondent's Brief, p.29.) However, for the reasons 
discussed in Part l(C)(5), above, there is no causation element to the necessity defense 
and, even if there were, Mr. Beavers presented prima facie evidence of causation in his 
offer of proof in the Second Case. 
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111. 
The District Court Erred At Mr. Beaver's Joint Sentencing Hearing By Enhancing 
Mr. Beavers' Sentences In The Second Case Based On Its Finding That He Had Been 
Previously Convicted Of Certain Drug Offenses In The First Case 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Beavers contends that the district court erred at his joint sentencing hearing 
when it ruled that his sentences in the Second Case could be enhanced based on his 
"prior convictions" in the First Case. (Appellant's Brief, pp.35-40.) This argument is 
based on his contention that the enhancement statutes at issue (I.C. §§ 37-2739, -
2739A, and -2732(B)(a)(7)), all of which are based on the existence of prior convictions 
for drug offenses, require the prior conviction to predate commission of the subsequent 
offense. (Appellant's Brief, pp.36-40.) 
In response, the State offers two arguments. First, the State asserts that the 
enhancement statutes require only that the prior conviction predate conviction of the 
subsequent offense and, therefore, the district court correctly determined that the 
enhancements apply in this case. (Respondent's Brief, pp.31-34.) Second, the State 
argues in the alternative that any error was harmless anyway because the district court 
only actually applied one of the three enhancements and, with regard to the one 
enhancement actually applied, the State thinks the district court would have inevitably 
imposed the same sentence even absent the enhancement. (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.30, 34-36.) For the reasons set forth below, neither of these arguments has merit. 
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B. Mr. Beavers' Sentences In The Second Case Could Not Be Enhanced Based On 
His Prior Convictions In The First Case Because Those Prior Convictions Did Not 
Exist At The Time That He Allegedly Committed The Offenses At Issue In The 
Second Case 
In his Appellant's Brief (pp.37-40), Mr. Beavers analogized the sentencing 
enhancements at issue in this case to another statutory sentencing enhancement aimed 
at punishing recidivism-Idaho's persistent violator statute, I.C. § 19-2514-and argued 
that the enhancements in this case ought to be similarly limited to situations in which the 
defendant's prior conviction pre-dated his commission of his subsequent offense. 
Mr. Beavers reasoned that such an interpretation of the enhancements (which is 
consistent with the majority rule in the United States), is logical because such statutes 
are intended to impose a harsher punishment on the defendant who, after having been 
previously convicted (and typically punished) for his first drug crime and, thus, given a 
strong warning, failed to learn his lesson and reform his behavior. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.38-40.) 
In response, the State concedes that the precise issue before the Court in this 
case is one of first impression. (Respondent's Brief, p.31.) Nevertheless, it offers of 
host of arguments in favor of a more expansive application of the sentencing 
enhancements at issue, and it asserts that, given its more expansive interpretation, the 
district court did not err in ruling that the enhancements could be applied to Mr. Beavers' 
Second Case. (Respondent's Brief, pp.31-34.) Ultimately, however, none of these 
arguments are persuasive. 
First, focusing on the one sentencing enhancement that was actually applied in 
this case, the State argues that Mr. Beavers' "argument is contrary to the plain language 
of the statute, which demands no specific sequence, but only requires a prior trafficking 
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conviction .... " (Respondent's Brief, p.31.) This assertion is internally inconsistent 
though. Because the enhancement provided for in section 37-2732B(a)(7) (and, 
indeed, all of the enhancements at issue in this case) requires a "prior" conviction, that 
statute does demand a specific sequence. 
The State has (mis)characterized section 37-2732B(a)(7) as "demand[ing] no 
specific sequence" because it wants to take advantage of the holding of State v. Craig, 
117 Idaho 983, 793 P.2d 215 (1990). (See Respondent's Brief, pp.31-32.) In Craig, the 
Idaho Supreme Court held that the statute elevating a third DUI offense to a felony (if 
they occurred within five years), I.C. § 18-8005(3), did not require the first two 
convictions to precede commission of the third offense. Craig, 117 Idaho at 984-85, 
793 P.2d at 216-17. However, the Craig holding turned on the fact that the statute at 
issue spoke in terms of "three (3) or more violations" and, therefore, did not require any 
specific sequence of offenses. Id. 
In contrast to the DUI statute at issue in Craig, the enhancements at issue in this 
case most certainly do require a specific sequence. Section 37-2739 speaks in terms of 
being "convicted of a second or subsequent offense"; section 37-2739A speaks in terms 
of someone "who has previously been convicted"; and section 37-2732(B)(a)(7) speaks 
in terms of "[a] second conviction." Accordingly, the State's characterization of those 
enhancements as not requiring a specific sequence is misplaced, Craig is inapplicable, 
and the State's "plain language" argument is devoid of merit. 
Second, the State asserts that this Court cannot give effect to the Legislature's 
intent in enacting the sentencing enhancements at issue in this case (and give those 
enhancements a narrow interpretation) because it claims that the plain language of the 
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enhancements clearly supports its broad reading of those enhancements. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.33.) However, as noted immediately above, the plain language 
of the sentencing enhancements does not clearly demand the broad application that the 
State now urges. Rather, the language of those enhancements all require a specific 
sequence of events, i.e., a conviction prior to the offense at issue, but all fail to specify 
what the conviction has to be prior to (whether it be commission of the subsequent 
offense, a finding of guilt of the subsequent offense, or some other event). Accordingly, 
there is nothing improper about this Court seeking to effectuate the Idaho Legislature's 
intent in interpreting the enhancements at issue. Cf. State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 341, 
343-44, 715 P.2d 1011, 1013-14 (Ct. App. 1986) (discussing, and attempting to give 
effect to, the legislative intent behind Idaho's persistent violator statute where that 
statute used language consistent with that which is used in the enhancements at issue 
in this case). Nor would there be anything improper about this Court invoking the rule of 
lenity and construing the statutes in a manner that is most favorable to the defendant. 
State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 386-87, 957 P .2d 1099, 1102-03 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Third, the State attempts to deflect Mr. Beavers' analogy to Idaho's persistent 
violator statute by pointing out that, in certain of the "persistent violator" cases, it was 
said that convictions entered the same day, or charged in the same information, may 
not always count as a single offense for purposes of evaluating the defendant's status 
as a persistent violator. (Respondent's Brief, pp.33-34.) However, the State's 
arguments in this regard are so far afield from any issue that is actually before this 
Court as to be completely irrelevant. Mr. Beavers has not analogized the 
enhancements at issue in this case to the persistent violator statute in an effort to argue 
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that his convictions in the First Case and the Second Case are somehow one and the 
same; his point is simply that the persistent violator statute has been interpreted as an 
attempt to punish recidivists for failing to learn the lessons attendant to their prior 
convictions and that this legislative intent can only be furthered where the prior 
conviction preceded the commission of the subsequent offense. 
Finally, the State asserts that even if Mr. Beavers was not convicted in the First 
Case prior to commission of the offenses charged in the Second Case, the legislative 
objective of punishing recidivism is still furthered by application of the sentencing 
enhancements in the Second Case because, by the time Mr. Beavers allegedly 
committed his offenses in that case, he was on notice of the wrongfulness of his 
conduct because he had already been arrested and charged in the First Case. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.34.) However, the fact is that Mr. Beavers believed he had a 
viable necessity defense in the First Case; thus, at the time of the alleged commission 
of the offenses in the Second Case it was not at all clear that his prior conduct had been 
wrongful in the First Case. Moreover, the State's focus on notice is misplaced. After all, 
we presume that everyone knows what the law is (so long as that law is reasonably 
clear). See Sprague v. City of Burley, 109 Idaho 656, 667-68, 710 P.2d 566, 577-78 
(1985). The question with recidivism statutes is whether the defendant has actually 
suffered a conviction and, typically, a sentence, and thus, has had impressed upon him 
the gravity of his actions and then had been given an opportunity to reform his conduct. 
Certainly, that did not happen in this case. 
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C. The District Court's Error Was Not Harmless 
The State's alternative argument is that, even if the district court did err in ruling 
that the charged enhancements could be applied in this case, that error was harmless 
because only one of the three enhancements was actually applied and, with regard to 
that enhancement, the State thinks the district court would have imposed the same 
sentence even absent the enhancement. (Respondent's Brief, pp.34-36.) This 
argument is misplaced. 
Initially, even though the district court did not apply the enhancement set forth in 
section 37-2739A, the district court's error in finding that sentencing enhancement 
potentially available was not harmless because the State has cross-appealed the district 
court's decision not apply that enhancement to the Second Case and, therefore, there is 
a possibility that Mr. Beavers' case will be remanded for a new sentencing hearing 
wherein that enhancement could be applied.8 (See Respondent's Brief, pp.37-45.) 
Moreover, the enhancement set forth in section 37-2732B(a)(7), which doubles the 
mandatory minimum fixed sentence for trafficking offenses when the defendant has 
previously been convicted of trafficking, was applied in this case. 
More importantly, the State has no basis to speculate that, even absent the 
enhancement set forth in section 37-2732B(a)(7), Mr. Beavers surely would have 
received the sentence of twelve years, with two years fixed on the trafficking count in 
the Second Case. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.35-36.) 
8 By pointing out that Mr. Beavers' case could be remanded based on the State's cross-
appeal, Mr. Beavers is not conceding error in the district court's decision not to apply 
the sentencing enhancement contained within I.C. § 37-2739A. 
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IV. 
The District Court Did Not Err In Declining To Apply The Sentence Enhancement At 
Issue 
A. Introduction 
After ruling that the three sentence enhancements discussed in Part 111 of 
Mr. Beavers' Appellant's Brief (pp.35-40) and Part Ill of this Appellant's Reply/ Cross-
Respondent's Brief (pp.23-29) were available for use in sentencing Mr. Beavers in the 
Second Case, the district court ultimately decided not to apply the enhancement 
provided for in I.C. § 37-2739A. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.1068, L.12 - p.1072, L.1, p.1072, 
Ls.16-23.) That enhancement, had it been applied, would have required at least a 
three-year sentence, consecutive to Mr. Beavers' other sentences, for his delivery 
conviction in the Second Case (based on his trafficking conviction in the First Case), 
and it would have allowed for a sentence up to fixed life on that particular count. 
I.C. § 37-2739A.9 However, the district court concluded that since there was no 
evidence that Mr. Beavers had ever been informed of this potential penalty, his 
conditional admission to the fact of his "prior" trafficking conviction could not stand as a 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to trial on that issue. (Tr. Vol. I, 
p.1069, L.5 - p.1072, L.1; see also R., pp.707, 711-13 (district court's subsequent 
9 Contrary to the State's claims (see Respondent's Brief, pp., 37, 44), nothing in section 
37-2739A requires that the three-year minimum sentence be ordered to be fixed. 
Compare I.C. § 37-2739A (making no mention of the words "fixed" or "determinate") 
with I.C. § 37-27398 (providing for the "fixed" minimum sentences in drug cases). Thus, 
should this Court determine that this case must be remanded for re-sentencing so that 
the district court might apply the minimum sentence provided for under section 
37-2739A, Mr. Beavers reserves his right to argue that that minimum sentence may be 
imposed as a wholly indeterminate sentence. 
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explanation of its decision).) Further, the district court reasoned that the sentence 
ultimately imposed on the delivery count-a concurrent sentence of five years, with two 
years fixed-appropriately satisfied Idaho's sentencing objectives (Tr. Vol. I, p.1068, 
Ls.12-19; see also R., pp.707, 708 (district court's subsequent explanation of its 
decision).) 
Following Mr. Beavers' sentencing hearing and entry of the district court's 
judgment of conviction, the State filed a motion, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35, to 
correct what the State believes is an illegal sentence. (R., pp. 693-96.) The State's 
argument at that time was that the district court had no authority to not apply the 
section 37-2739A enhancement to Mr. Beavers' delivery conviction in the Second Case. 
(R., pp.694-96.) The district court, however, denied the State's motion on the basis 
that, without a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial on the 
facts underlying the enhancement, the district court simply could not apply that 
enhancement to the Second Case. (R., pp.707, 711-13.) The district court further 
explained that the sentence ultimately imposed satisfied the applicable sentencing 
objectives (R., pp.707, 708) and made it clear that, had it been strictly required to apply 
the enhancement, it would have structured Mr. Beavers' sentences in such a way as to 
achieve the same aggregate sentence (R., pp.711, 714). 
The State now cross-appeals. (See generally Respondent's Brief, pp.37-45.) In 
its appeal, the State takes the position that the district court effectively withdrew 
Mr. Beavers' guilty plea on the enhancement without returning the parties to the status 
quo ante, and that it effectuated a de facto dismissal of the sentencing enhancement 
through "its refusal to apply that enhancement and its refusal to allow the state to 
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proceed on its charge." (Respondent's Brief, pp.37-41.) Thus, the State prays for a 
remand of Mr. Beavers' case so that the State may prove the facts underlying the 
enhancement at trial. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.37-43.) The State also argues that 
the district court abused its discretion by failing to "apply the enhancement because it 
had met the goals of sentencing without regard to the enhancement," and it asks that, 
upon remand for a trial on the enhancement, the district court be ordered to apply the 
enhancement. (Respondent's Brief, pp.41-43.) Finally, the State contends that, 
regardless of whether Mr. Beavers' plea to the enhancement was knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary, the district court had no choice but to apply the enhancement. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.43-45.) 
The State's contentions are without merit. First, the State, as the appellant on 
this particular issue, cannot be heard to complain about the district court's decision to 
withdraw Mr. Beavers' "plea" to the enhancement without setting the matter for a new 
trial and allowing the State to prove the facts underlying the enhancement, where the 
State never made that argument below. Second, the district court did not err in 
safeguarding Mr. Beavers' due process rights by declining to apply a sentence 
enhancement which Mr. Beavers did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily plead 
guilty to. Third, to the extent that any error did occur in the district court's 
unconventional handling of this issue, that error was harmless. 
B. The State's Primary Argument On Appeal-That It Should Have Been Returned 
To The Status Quo Ante Following The Withdrawal Of Mr. Beavers' "Guilty Plea" 
To The Enhancements-ls Not Properly Before This Court Because It Was 
Never Raised Below 
Prior to Mr. Beavers' joint sentencing hearing, the State filed a sentencing 
memorandum implicitly asserting that Mr. Beavers' convictions in the First Case could 
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be used to support the sentencing enhancements charged in the Second Case, and 
also offering the State's interpretation of how the enhancements should work with the 
base sentences involved in Mr. Beavers' cases. (R., pp.661-66.) At the sentencing 
hearing itself, the State reiterated these arguments. (Tr. Vol. I, p.1014, L.4 - p.1020, 
L.22.) Ultimately, when the district court announced its intent not to impose the 
enhancement provided for by I.C. § 37-2739A (based on its recognition that 
Mr. Beavers had not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to trial on 
the fact underlying the charged enhancement), the State protested and hinted at its 
intent to appeal the district court's decision in that regard. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.1073, L.17 -
p.1075, L.16.) Later, the State even filed a motion to correct an allegedly illegal 
sentence, arguing that the district court had no choice but to impose the enhancement 
provided for in section 37-2739A. (R., pp.693-96.) At no point, however, did the State 
ever object on the basis that the enhancement had been "effectively dismissed" such 
that the State was deprived of its chance to prove the facts underlying that 
enhancement, and at no point did the State move the district court for a trial on the 
enhancement. ( See generally Tr. Vol. I, p.1068, L.12 - p.1076, L.6; R., pp.693-96.) 
It is now well-established under Idaho law that an appellant cannot be heard to 
complain on appeal about matters that were never raised in, or decided by, the district 
court. State v. Ouva/t, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (1998). In this case, 
since the State (the appellant as to this limited issued) presents an argument 
concerning the denial of its opportunity to prove the enhancement in question which 
was never raised in, or passed upon by, the district court, that issue is not properly 
before this Court. 
33 
C. The District Court Was Correct Not To Have Applied The Enhancement In 
Question Where It Knew That Mr. Beavers' "Guilty Plea" To That Enhancement 
Was Not Knowingly, Intelligently, And Voluntarily Entered 
The State argues, apparently in the alternative, that even if it is not entitled to a 
remand of Mr. Beavers' case for an opportunity to prove the enhancement at issue at 
trial, this Court should conclude that the district court imposed an illegal sentence and it 
should remand Mr. Beavers' case for a new sentencing hearing wherein the 
enhancement may be applied, despite the fact that Mr. Beavers' plea was not 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.43-45.) 
Thus, the State apparently would have had the district court actively participate in a 
violation of Mr. Beavers' Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law. See 
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969) (holding that a guilty plea must be 
knowingly and voluntarily given in order to comport with the Fourteenth Amendment's 
requirement of due process). However, Mr. Beavers submits that the prudent and 
correct course of action for the district court in this case was to safeguard his due 
process rights by refusing to impose a sentencing enhancement for which he had not 
entered a valid plea. After all, the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause is 
supreme and, therefore, where it conflicts with the application of a sentencing statute, 
must control over the statute. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. 10 Accordingly, the district 
10 The Supremacy Clause states as follows: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made 
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. 
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court did not err in failing to apply the sentencing enhancement provided for in section 
37-2739A. 
D. Even If The District Court Erred In Declining To Apply The Sentencing 
Enhancement At Issue In Mr. Beavers' Second Case, That Error Was Harmless 
Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance 
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." Mr. Beavers submits that 
any error in failing to apply the sentencing enhancement provided for in section 37-
2739A which was based on the conclusion that Mr. Beavers' "plea" to the enhancement 
was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered, would fall into this category of 
harmless error. The State, therefore, is not entitled to any relief on appeal. 
1. The Sentencing Enhancement Provided For In I.C. § 37-2739A Does Not 
Apply To This Case Because The Convictions In The First Case Were Not 
"Previous" Convictions Within The Meaning Of That Enhancement 
Provision 
For the reasons stated more fully in Part Ill of Mr. Beavers' Appellant's Brief 
(pp.35-40) and Part Ill of this Appellant's Reply Brief/ Cross-Respondent's Brief (pp.23-
29), and hereby incorporated herein by this reference, Mr. Beavers contends that the 
sentencing enhancement for "previous[ ]" convictions for "felony offenses of dealing, 
selling or trafficking in controlled substances" (I.C. § 37-2739A) cannot apply in this 
case, where the "previous[]" conviction (in the First Case) came about after commission 
of the subsequent offense (in the Second Case). As a consequence, any error on the 
district court's part in failing to apply that enhancement against Mr. Beavers in the 
Second Case, based on the belief that Mr. Beavers' "plea" to that enhancement was not 
knowingly, intelligently, and vol.untarily entered, was harmless. 
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2. Even If It Had Applied The Sentencing Enhancement At Issue, The 
Record Demonstrates That The District Court Would Have Imposed The 
Same Aggregate Sentence That Was Ultimately Imposed 
At Mr. Beavers' consolidated sentencing hearing, the district court made it clear 
that the appropriate aggregate prison sentence for Mr. Beavers' crimes is, in its view, 
that which was ultimately imposed-twelve years, with three years fixed. (Tr. Vol. I, 
p.1065, L.9 - p.1068, l.10.) The only question, therefore, is how the district court 
intended to arrive at that aggregate sentence. Although the State now complains about 
how the district court did so (in declining to utilize the enhancement provided for in 
section 37-2739A), the fact is that the district court made it clear that if it were forced to 
apply the sentencing enhancement at issue, it still would have structured Mr. Beavers' 
sentences in such a way as to arrive at the aggregate sentence ultimately imposed in 
this case-twelve years, with three years fixed. 11 (See Tr. Vol. I, p.1073, L.23 - p.1076, 
L.6; R., pp.709-11, 714.) In light of this fact, any error on the district court's part in 
failing to apply the enhancement against Mr. Beavers in the Second Case, based on the 
11 The district court read section 37-2739A as requiring a fixed minimum sentence (see, 
e.g., R., pp.706-07)-a conclusion with which Mr. Beavers disagrees. (See note 9, 
supra.) Under Mr. Beavers' reading of section 37-2739A the district court could have 
simply imposed fully indeterminate sentences in the Second Case to have achieved the 
same aggregate sentence of twelve years, with three years fixed. 
On the other hand, the district court also read section 37-2739A as requiring only 
that the sentence imposed for delivery in the Second Case run consecutively to the 
other sentences in the Second Case, not the sentences in the First Case. (See 
R., pp.709-11, 714.) This is a conclusion with which Mr. Beavers agrees. Accordingly, 
he contends that an alternative avenue of achieving the same aggregate sentence was, 
as the district court pointed out, to impose a three-year fixed sentence on the delivery 
conviction, consecutive to fully indeterminate sentences on the other convictions in the 
Second Case, and concurrently with all of the sentences in the First Case. 
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belief that Mr. Beavers' "plea" to that enhancement was not knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily entered, was harmless.12 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, as well as in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Beavers 
respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions and remand both of his 
cases for new trials, wherein he will be allowed to present his necessity defense and 
have the respective juries instructed on the defense of necessity. In the alternative, 
Mr. Beavers requests that his sentences be vacated and his cases remanded for a new 
sentencing hearing. 
12 Mr. Beavers is not unmindful of the fact that his harmless error argument in this 
section is in direct conflict with part of his argument in Part lll(C}, above (arguing against 
the State's harmless error argument). Obviously, Mr. Beavers cannot hope to prevail in 
both instances; he merely prays that, whatever this Court's conclusion with respect to 
the parties' harmless error arguments, it is applied consistently as to both parties. 
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